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Abstract

The concept of internal control began in accounting professional groups, gradually
expanded to the administrative control and the risk management from accounting control,
and became an important area that cannot be excluded from the operation of the public
companies in the U.S.
When the Enron scandal struck the credibility of the stock market in the U.S. in
2001, the authorities implemented reformative measures including the SOX enactment to
protect investors. Although there has been a controversy over this legislation since the
enactment of the SOX, it appears that the U.S. capital market has been restoring confidence
with the efforts of regulators.
Also, when the foreign exchange crisis and large-scale corporate accounting frauds
occurred in Korea, there were demands that companies should establish internal control
systems through legislations. However, the authorities in Korea tried to solve the problem
by importing internal control system mainly from the U.S. and Japan since there was no
various discussions of internal control for a long time. As a result, Korea individual
legislations separately imported the internal control provisions from the U.S. and Japan,
ii

and they have contained illogical and cost increase problems. The most fundamental
problem is that it is difficult to apply extensive concept of internal control like risk
management to public companies that are not financial companies, because there is no
general provision related the internal control in the Commercial Act, a general act for
public companies. Next, cost problem companies are neglected to establish the internal
control. Last, that is a conflict problem of internal control provisions in Korea legislations.
To solve these legislative problems, a general provision on internal control should
be created in the Commercial Act. Second, it is necessary to approach companies with
indirect regulation method like the U.S. and Japan to minimize the cost of establishment.
Finally, it is required to integrate and operate internal control agencies that possibly cause
confusion. Also, it is necessary to encourage companies to participate in establishing
internal control system by implementing proper incentive systems rather than only
imposing regulation.
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Ⅰ. Introduction
A. Background
The credibility of capital markets fell, and the stock price collapsed due to the
Enron 1 and World Com scandal 2 in 2001. The Enron which reported $138.7 billion in
revenues and placed the company at the seventh position on the Fortune Global 500 for the
nine months of 2001, 3 filed for bankruptcy protection in December of that year. It was
revealed that 96% of the net income reported in 2000 was by accounting manipulation. The
reason for this was the lack of supervision by the board of directors and independence of
external auditors. Illegal acts within the Enron have broken at once the trust of the U.S.
capital markets that boasted the world class level of transparency and fairness. After this
case, the most innovative measure was taken to restore the credibility of the U.S. capital
market with the consideration that the existing regulations were not capable of responding

1

Choi, Joon-Sun, migug-ui gieobgaehyeogbeob - 2002nyeon-ui sabeinseu ogseullibeob [The U.S.
Corporate Reform Act – Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002], 9(2) THE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE PRIVATE LAW
507, 507-8 (Oct. 2002). The Enron scandal is a case in which the Enron quickly has grown into the world
class energy company, but eventually went into bankruptcy with financial and lobbying activities, not normal
business. The Enron reached more than $ 100 billion sales performance, and it became the U.S. 7 th largest
company in 2000, but it went insolvent within a year. The company shift its debt and losses to subsidiaries,
and it violated ‘generally accepted accounting principles’ (GAAP), using special purpose entities. The
Enron’s stock price was US$ 90.75 per share in mid-2000, but plummeted to less than $1 by the end of Nov.
2001. After the Enron’s bankruptcy, the company recorded the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history
until WorldCom’s bankruptcy.
2

The Guardian, WORLDCOM ACCOUNTING SCANDAL,

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2002/aug/09/corporatefraud.worldcom2 (last visited Nov. 29, 2017)
(stating “An internal audit in WorldCom discovered that $3.3 billion in profits were improperly recorded on
its books from 1999 to the first quarter of 2002”).
3

Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2001; Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins,
Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and Key Financial Measures, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, 97 (2008).
-1-

effectively to large accounting fraud. In this crisis, the most innovative reform legislation,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter “SOX”) was promulgated since the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which had played an important role
as the fundamental legislations of the U.S. capital market.
Also, the Daewoo Group was forced to be dissolved by the court’s decisions, for
excessively expanding its business in 1999. The Supreme Court found the chairman of the
Daewoo Group, Kim, Woo-Choong was guilty for being involved in the fraudulent
accounting of 41 trillion won [approximately $ 36.7 billion (1,115 won/1 U.S. dollar)]. 4
After the financial crisis in 1997 and several fraudulent accounting scandals of
conglomerates, various bills were introduced for the advancement of the accounting
system.
Particularly, the Korea has prepared the revision of the individual bills by importing
main provisions of SOX since the enactment of the act in the U.S. 5 The general provisions
for the internal control were not legislated to the Commercial law, a general law for public
companies was individually imported to the various special laws in Korea although the

4

OHMYNEWS, Daewoo bunsighoegye 50jo... 200eogdalleo haeoebimilgwanli [Daewoo Fraudulent
accounting 50 trillion…$20 billion foreign secret management],
http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000031666 (last visited Nov. 29,
2017). The chairman Kim has been managing over $20 billions over the past three years through British
Finance organization (BFC) established in London, the U.K.
5

Suh, Hun Je, 2002nyeon migug gaeeobgaehyeogbeob-e daehan yeongu [A Study on the U.S. SarbanesOxley Act of 2002], 6(2) CHUNG-ANG L. REV. 161, 214-6 (July 2004). These reformative legislations were
revised bills of the Securities and Exchange Act, the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, and the
Certified Public Accountants Act. Particularly, the bills of the Securities and Exchange Act included the
provisions related to the certification system of the CEO and other relevant officers, importing the Article
302 and 906 of SOX. However, the opposite views were raised by public companies that the bill could be the
burden to the CEO because financial statements were ultimately decided by the board, even if the CEO and
other accounting officers could make them.
-2-

U.S. introduced the internal control system for public companies. In addition, the penal
clauses of the Securities and Exchange Act of Korea were lighter than those of SOX, and
had limitations as to the effectiveness of the law. 6

B. Purpose and Synopsis
The purpose of this study is to review the development of the internal control
concept, the legislations amendments, and the relevant judicial precedents in the U.S. for
the implication of the legislations related to the internal control in Korea. This Thesis
consists of five parts.
Part Ⅱ begins with describing how the U.S. internal concept had begun and
developed. In the process, I will review the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977(hereafter
“FCPA”) and parts related to the internal control of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations prior to the SOX. It is necessary to examine how the internal control concept
shaped and developed the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission reports (hereafter “COSO reports”) and how they had created modern internal
control concepts. After that, I will explain main provisions related to the internal control of
the SOX which has considered to be the most reformative legislation since the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the U.S. After analyzing the

6

Id. at 217. If management breaches the certification obligation, the defendants shall be punished by

imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a fine of $ 5 million under the SOX, but only imprisonment for
not more than 5 years or less than a fine of 30 million won [$ 26,905 (1,115 won/ 1 U.S. dollar)] under the
Securities Exchange Act of Korea.
-3-

relevant cases about the internal control obligations, I will write about how the courts had
evaluated the duties of boards of directors on internal control.
In part Ⅲ, I will explain the main clauses and the problems of three legislations
about the internal control system in Korea. Those are the internal accounting management
regulations of the External Audit Act, the compliance officer of the Act on Corporate
Governance of Financial Companies, and the compliance assistant of the Commercial Act.
Comparing to the U.S. internal control system, I would like to point out the problems of
the legislations of internal control in Korea. First, it is difficult to apply the concept of the
internal control to public companies that are not financial companies because there is no a
general provision on internal control in the Commercial Act as a general law for public
companies. Next, I will describe the cost burden problems of companies to implement the
internal control provisions. Even if the ideas of the internal control is positive, if the burden
of public companies is ignored, the legislations will be subjective to formal administrative
regulations, and it will be hard to expect substantial effect to the investors’ protection.
Additionally, I will mention the conflict issues related to the internal control in Korea.
Those are mainly about the works inefficiency and duplication problems such as the
distinction problems between the compliance officer and the compliance supporter and the
reporting issues of them.
In part Ⅳ, I will suggest several implications that the legislature can refer to make
laws related to the internal control system in Korea. The internal control system had to
relied on imports of the U.S. and Japanese legislations. Issues in regards to this matter
were not addressed and discussed until many years later unlike the laws in the U.S.
-4-

legislations. As a result, there are a contradiction that the general provision for the internal
control cannot applied to public companies that are not financial companies because the
provision was not included in the Commercial Act. For that reason, the Commercial Act
should include a general provision for the internal control system. To minimize the cost of
implementing the internal control clauses, I will suggest my opinion as how to make the
criteria of public companies to which the internal control provisions can be applied. Also,
I will mention which regulation approach can be more effective between direct and indirect
method for the internal control. The last part will address the need for an appropriate
incentive system to encourage public companies to voluntarily participate. The part Ⅴ will
summarize the conclusion of this study.

Ⅱ. Development and Current situation of Internal Control System in the U.S.
A. The beginning of the concept of internal control
Generally speaking, “Internal control serves as a first line of defense in
safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors and fraud”. 7 Historically, the term
of internal control has been mainly used by the accounting professional groups and the
accounting groups have used the term ambiguously as to the exact meaning and scope at

7

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-361, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: CONSIDERATION OF

KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES, at 13
(2006), available at
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fassets%2F250%2F249736.pdf
(last visited on October 17, 2017).
-5-

first. In 1949, the term of ‘internal control’ first emerged in a publication of the American
Institute of Accountants, the predecessor of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (“AICPA”). 8
AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure published a special report titled
「Internal Control: Elements of a Coordinated System and Its Importance to Management
and The Independent Public Accountant」 to conceptualize internal control. The report
defined internal control as “the plan of organization and all of the coordinate methods and
measures adopted within a business to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and
reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence
to prescribed managerial policies.” 9 In other words, the accounting groups broadly
recognized the definition of internal controls as beyond those matters which relate directly
to the functions of the accountings from the outset.
Afterward, these concepts distinguished between accounting controls that directly
relate to the financial records and the safeguarding of assets and administrative controls by
Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 29 in October 1958. 10 Although the audit procedure

8

Comm. on Law and Accounting, Management Reports on Internal Control: A Legal Perspective, 49 BUS.

L. 889, 892, n 13 (Feb. 1994).
9

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS. COMMITTEE ON AUDITING PROCEDURE,

INTERNAL CONTROL: ELEMENTS OF A COORDINATED SYSTEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO MANAGEMENT AND THE
INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, special report, 6 (1949); Peter Ferola, Internal Control in the Aftermath
of Sarbanes-Oxley: One Size doesn’t Fit All, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 87, 90 (2006).
10

THE COMMITTEE ON AUDITING PROCEDURE OF THE AICPA, STATEMENTS ON AUDITING PROCEDURE NO.

29: SCOPE OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REVIEW OF INTERNAL CONTROL 36 (1958) (stating that
“accounting controls generally include the systems of authorization and approval, separation of duties
concerned with record keeping and accounting reports. On the other hand, Administrative controls generally
-6-

might be classified as accounting controls and administrative controls and the auditor’s
responsibilities are basically limited to accounting controls, the control methods could vary
depending on individual circumstances. For example, if the auditor believes that certain
administrative controls affect the financial records, he could consider the need of such
controls. 11
However, Because the term of internal control has been approached beyond the
accounting functions of a company, and accounting groups have ambiguously used the
term, there was a limitation that prevented from successfully defying the term. After that,
there has been several attempts to distinguish between the accounting controls and
administrative controls. The AICPA formally abandoned the efforts in 1988. 12

B. Introduction of internal control regulation by public agencies.

1. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (1977)
Basically, private organizations mainly have discussed problems of the internal
control because they were the discretion of enterprise’s management to decide whether to
establish internal control systems within the organizations for business purposes. However,
the FCPA which was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1977 enacted the first public

include statistical analyses, time and motion studies, performance reports, employee training programs, and
quality controls.”
11

Id. at 37.

12

Id.
-7-

regulations on the U.S. internal controls. 13
The FCPA was originally triggered by the Watergate scandal, 14 and the SEC
investigation discovered over $300 million of questionable payments by U.S. companies
to foreign government officials. 15 Subsequently, the SEC began investigations, and
proposed an autonomous disclosure program in which companies could report suspicious
internal and external payments or accounting practices to the SEC on March 8, 1974. As a
result, approximately 360 companies reported their funding and accounting practices until
March 1977, and eventually about 400 companies participated in the program. After the
SEC’s investigation, it was revealed that unlawful payments required secret funds based
on accounting fraud and inappropriate accounting books and records. Therefore, the FCPA
adopted two approaches to counter bribery, which were accounting provisions and antibribery provisions. 16 The accounting provisions focus on disclosure. It requires all
companies registered with the SEC to keep accounts of all transactions, and establish an

13

Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption – The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, 33 N.C.J. INT’L L.

& COM. REG. 83, 84 (2007). The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, also, was the first legislation
in the world to recognize and seek to curb the contribution of domestic corporations to foreign corruptions.
After that, the FCPA was incorporated into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
14

Daniel L. Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – The Federalization

of Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (Nov. 1979). (stating that “when the
Watergate investigation uncovered instances of the covert use of corporate funds for illegal corporate political
contributions, the SEC began to consider whether the concealment of these contributions violated the
disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.”)
15

Krever, supra note 14, at 87. The 527 companies, the SEC report listed, were major U.S. corporations such

as Exxon Mobile, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Gulf Oil.
16

Id.
-8-

internal accounting control system. 17 The anti-bribery provisions prohibit the U.S.
companies from making payments to foreign officials for her help to retain business. 18

2. The United States Sentencing Commission (1991)
The U.S. Sentencing Commission announced the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations, which provide an effective compliance and ethics program, in 1991. 19 It

17

Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) - (B) (2000).
(2) Every [SEC-reporting] issuer… shall…
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances that –
(ⅰ) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization;
(ⅱ) transactions are recorded as necessary (Ⅰ) to permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and (Ⅱ) to maintain accountability for assets;
(ⅲ) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific
authorization; and
(ⅳ) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable
intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.

18

Id.

19

Johanna Pitcairn, “Corporate Compliance and Executive Compensation since the AIG Scandal”, 82

N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 35, 36 (2010).
According to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Compliance officers rely on the seven steps of the
Guidelines to implement an effective compliance program.
1. Set up standards and procedures to prevent and detect non-compliance with the regulatory
scheme.
-9-

was the U.S. Sentencing Commission, an independent organization in the federal judiciary
that declared a sentence guideline for organizations.
The main content was that punishment could be reduced if companies effectively
establish an internal control system that can prevent and detect criminal conducts, even if
the firms violate the laws. 20 Specifically, if a company reports to relevant authorities within
a reasonable period, actively cooperates with the investigation, and expressly
acknowledges the responsibility for the criminal conducts, punishment can be significantly
reduced. Internal control system including a compliance program was required to quickly
report to the authorities. It could be evaluated that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations provided incentives for establishment of internal control system within the

2. Top management and the board must play a proactive role in overseeing the program.
3. Eliminate individuals with authority whose prior conduct is inconsistent with strict
compliance standards.
4. Communicate standards and procedures effectively among directors and officers.
5. Monitor and audit the compliance program periodically and maintain an effective system for
reporting non-compliance.
6. Enforce the program through effective incentives and establish appropriate disciplinary
procedures to deal with non-compliance, including compensation reduction.
7. If non-compliance is discovered, take reasonable and prompt steps to avoid future problems,
including modifying the compliance program, as needed.
20

Id. at 37. The U.S. Supreme Court held that “if a company has an anti-harassment compliance policy and

procedure in place, and an employee fails to use them to report harassing behavior, the employer can present
the compliance program as an affirmative defense to a hostile work environment claim.” in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
- 10 -

organizations. 21 The Guidelines created a new position, the Ethics & Compliance officer,
and spurred companies to improve existing compliance programs or create new compliance
programs. 22

C. The Formulation of Internal Control Concept

1. Treadway commission (1992)
One of the institutions that played a major role in establishing the concept of
internal control in the U.S. was the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (hereafter “COSO”) under the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting (hereafter “Treadway Commission). The COSO published the report
of the Treadway Commission to identify the causes of fraudulent financial reporting, and
review measures to deter its occurrence, with the cooperation of American Institute of
CPAs, American Accounting Association, Financial Executive International, Institute of
Internal Auditors, and National Association of Accountants in 1980s.
After that, the COSO reviewed the corporate structure, not limited to financial
reporting, to prevent and rectify frauds within the organizations, and published a final

21

Yang, Man-Sig, Isaui naebutongjesiseutem-ui guchugchaeg-imgwa hyeonsang-e gwanhan yeongu [A
Study on Responsibilities and Current States of the internal Control], 25(1) BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 249,
252-3 (2011).
22

Yook, Tae-woo, Migug-eseoui gieob keompeullaieonseuui baljeon- jedojeog jinhwagwajeong mich
choegeun-ui panlyebeobsang-ui jeog-yong [Development of Corporate Compliance in the United States –
Evolving Process of the System and Its Application to Case Laws], 39 KANGWON LAW REVIEW, 134, 140
(2013).
- 11 -

report on how to define the concept of the internal control and the evaluation standard in
1992. This report is the “Internal Control-Integrated Framework” (the COSO report of
1992) that comprehensively defines and describes the internal controls.

2. COSO Report (1992, 2004, 2013)
ⅰ. The definition of Terms for the Internal control (COSO of 1992)
The COSO report of 1992 describes that the concept of internal control is a
reasonable process implemented by a board of directors, management and other employees
to achieve three objectives that are ① effectiveness and efficiency of operations, ②

reliability of financial reporting, ③ compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 23 In

order to achieve the above three objectives, the report explains that it is necessary for five

elements to be worked organically. The five elements are ① Control environment
(integrity, ethical values and abilities, management philosophy and behavior style, etc.),

② Risk assessment (duties to identify and analyze risks related goals achievement), ③

Control Activities (policies and procedures to ensure that management orders are
implemented), ④ Information and communication systems, ⑤ Monitoring. 24
According to the report, the purpose of establishing internal control is to achieve

23

COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, INTERNAL CONTROL-

INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 9 (1992).
24

Id.
- 12 -

the above three objectives that are effectiveness and efficiency of business activities,
reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with related laws and regulations. In other
words, the central task of internal control is to comply with laws and regulations to attain
management objectives of a company effectively and efficiently, and as a result, the
appropriateness of financial reporting is needed. Also, the subject to accomplish these goals
should be management, and the obligation to monitor and improve their effectiveness
continuously is also a part of management. Eventually, the concrete way to achieve the
management goals depends on the management’s own discretion. 25 Since then, the internal
control concept in the COSO report of 1992 has been accepted by the SOX in 2002, which
has also affected legislations in other countries, including Korea and Japan.

ⅱ. Integrated Framework as Risk Management (COSO of 2004)
In the COSO report of 2004, the concept of internal control has been described in
‘the Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework, integrating the concept in the
SOX report of 2002. In other words, it was clearly declared that the internal control was a
system to effectively manage the entire risks of company’s business activities as a premise
of management activities.
The reason to release the COSO report of 2004 was that it required the
maintenance of an internal control management system beyond the SOX. Namely, it was

25

Yook, Tae-woo, Migug ilbon dog-il-eseoui gieob keompeullaieonseu gaenyeom mich jedoui baljeongwa
uli beobjee daehan sisajeom [Development of Definition and System of Corporate Compliance in USA,
Japan, and Germany and Its Implications on Korean Legal System], Gyeong-yeongbeoblyul [Business Law],
369 (2017).
- 13 -

not guarantee the success of the business, and it was required new risk management system
to achieve business goals properly according to the COSO report of 2004. Therefore, risk
management was required as the next step, based on the completeness of reporting under
the SOX. 26
The COSO report of 2004 defines Enterprise risk management (hereafter “ERM”)
as follows.
Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors,
management and other personnel applied in strategy setting and across the
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the achievement of entity objectives. 27

Enterprise risk management structure consists of ① Strategic (high-level

goals, aligned with and supporting its mission), ② Operation (effective and

efficient use of its resources), ③ Reporting (reliability of reporting), ④
Compliance (compliance with applicable laws and regulations). 28

26

Son, Young Hoa, Naebutongjewa junbeobjiwon-injedo [Internal Control and Compliance System in
Korea], 60 Seonjinsangsabeoblyul-yeongu [ADVANCED COMMERCIAL LAW RESEARCH], 151 (2012).
27

COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, ENTERPRISE RISK

MANAGEMENT-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 2 (Sep. 2004), available
https://www.coso.org/Pages/erm-integratedframework.aspx (last visited on November 1, 2017).
28

Id. at 3.
- 14 -

at

There are several differences between the internal control in COSO of 2002 and the
Enterprise risk management in COSO of 2004 as follows. First, the concept of internal
control in the COSO of 1992 had three objectives, but the strategy perspective was added
and had precedence over the other three objectives in the COSO report of 2004. Next,
although the internal control integration structure had three components, it expanded to
eight components in the report of 2004. The enterprise risk management in 2004, also,
included the integrated structure of internal control in the report of 1992, and described
that the internal control-integrated structure was an indispensable element as a part of the
enterprise risk management. As a result, the enterprise risk management expanded and
refined the components of internal control described in COSO report of 1992. 29

29

Chung, Dae, Geullobeol seutaendeodeuloseoui naebutongje – sangjanghoesaui junbeobjiwon-injedo [A
Study on Internal Control as a Global Standard: Compliance Officer System of Publicly Held Corporation],
43 L. REV., 267, 272 (Aug. 2011).
- 15 -

Figure 1. THE COSO FRAMEWORK IN THE COSO REPORT OF 2004 30

ⅲ. Ensuring the Reliability of Non-Financial Reports (COSO of 2013)
The COSO has reviewed its internal control, and has published an updated version
of 2004 report in 2013 (hereafter “COSO report of 2013) after conducting an international
online survey in November 2011. The COSO of 2013 expanded the scope of financial
reporting and supplemented unclear or abstract parts, complementing the internal control
concept in the COSO report of 1992. 31
The COSO report of 2013 defined “internal control as a process, effected by board
of directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance

30

COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 5.

31

Park, Sei-Hwa, Naebutongjee gwanhan hangug gieobbeobje-ui hyeonhwang-gwa gwaje [The Current
Situation and Prospect of Internal Control System in Korean Corporate Laws], 30(1) BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
39, 41 (2015).
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regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations, reporting, and
compliance.” 32
There are similarities in the concept of internal control of between the COSO report
of 1992 and 2013, nevertheless there are multiple differences and they are as follow: First,
the term, reliability of financial reporting in the purpose of internal control in the COSO
report of 1992 was changed to reliability of reporting. The reason is that it is necessary to
secure the reliability of the entire reports including the disclosure of non-financial
information such as a CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) report and a Sustainability
report. The monitoring, also, which was one among the five internal control components
in the COSO report of 1992, was changed to ‘monitoring activities’ to prevent the
component from concentrating only on the control itself. 33 Next, although the COSO report
of 1992 used the existing departmental units and the entire company as an organizational
unit, the COSO report of 2014 had internal control implemented by each unit, clarifying
roles and responsibilities of functional units, operational units, business units, and
subsidiary companies. Additionally, the COSO report of 2014 considered the governance
structure of the audit committee, the compensation committee, and the executive
recommendation committee besides the board of directors. Above all, the most significant

32

COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, INTERNAL CONTROL –

INTEGRATED
FRAMEWORK
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY,
3
(May
2013),
available
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=https%3A%2F%2Fna.theiia.org%2Fstandardsguidance%2Ftopics%2FDocuments%2FExecutive_Summary.pdf (last visited on November 21, 2017).
33

Id. at 4. (stating “Control activities are performed at all levels of the entity, at various stages within

business processes, and over the technology environment. They may be preventive or detective in nature
and may encompass a range manual and automated activities such as authorizations and approvals,
verifications, reconciliations…”).
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at

feature of the COSO report of 2013 is to provides only a minimal set of principles for the
internal control, and to gives the discretion to companies to customize it. 34

D. The legislation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act

1. The Overview of SOX of 2002
The internal control concept of the COSO report of 1992 was reflected by the SOX
in 2002, which affected the regulation for public companies of other countries including
Korea and Japan. The SOX which had been enacted in July 2002 after the Enron scandal
in 2001, required a complicated compliance structure for public companies. The SOX dealt
with the independence of auditors, the responsibilities of public companies, the
improvement of internal control, and the enhancement of financial disclosure provisions.
Under the Act, a powerful and independent Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) has been established to deal with corporate scandals, and to oversee audits of
public companies which are applied to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 35
The SOX prohibited the auditors from conducting works affecting the audits to
avoid the conflict of interest, and tried to prevent companies from committing fraudulent
acts by provisions related to whistleblowers, and strengthened the penalties for company
frauds.

34

Suh, Wan Suk, Gieob-ui naebutongje hwalseonghwa bang-on [The Revitalization Plan of Corporation’s
Internal Control System], 43 Beobhag-yeongu [LAW REVIEW] 27, 45-7 (2015).
35

Yook, supra note 22, 142-6.
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The SOX, also, strengthened corporate disclosure system to protect investors.
Management was held responsible for establishing internal control system and evaluating
the effectiveness of the system. The auditors were liable to attest the evaluation of
management, and had the obligation to report the results to the Audit Committee. The
public companies should disclose any significant changes in the financial statements
including non-financial statements.

2. Main provisions of the SOX
ⅰ. Procedures for Complaints under Audit Committee (Section 301)
It is effective to establish procedures for complaints in which employees of public
companies can raise problems regarding unlawful behaviors. 36 Generally, it is difficult to
detect illegal acts such as forgery or embezzlement that occur in the business before internal
staff report misconducts. There is consistent evaluation that it is effective to establish
internal reporting system to deter frauds, which are increasingly intelligent and
confidential. 37 In the U.S., Whistle-blowers in the federal governments were first protected
in the 1970s. The SOX obligated the Audit Committee of listed companies to establish
anonymous procedures for complaints regarding accounting, internal accounting controls,
or audit matters. 38 If a whistle-blower, also, reasonably believed that there is a violation of

36

Park, supra note 31, at 58.

37

Id.

38

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301, 107 P.L. 204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). “(4) Complaints. - Each audit committee
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federal law that regulates fraudulent behaviors related to Finance, Securities, and
Shareholders, he could be legally protected. 39

ⅱ. Certification responsibility of CEO and other financial officers (Section 302)
The principal executive officer’s certification requirements of the SOX section
302(a) are mainly related to internal control through disclosure regulations. In other words,
principal executive officers, principal financial officers, and other officers should certify
specific matters in the company’s periodic reports which is submitted to the SEC under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section 13(a) or 15(d). 40 The relevant officers should
certify that the financial statements and other financial information fairly present the
financial condition and operation of the company. 41 The officers should disclose to the
auditors and the audit committee all significant deficiencies in the operation of internal

shall establish procedures for-- (A) the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the issuer
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters; and (B) the confidential, anonymous
submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.”
39

Id. § 806. “Remedies --(1) In general - An employee prevailing in any action under subsection (b)(1)
shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole. (2) Compensatory damages - Relief for
any action…”

40

Id. § 302(a)

41

Id. § 302(a)(3). Also, according to the SOX § 302(a)(4), (stating “the executive officers are responsible for
establishing and maintaining internal controls, have designed such internal controls, and have evaluated the
effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls, and have presented in the report their conclusions about the
effectiveness of their internal controls.”)
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control and any fraud that involves management. 42
Also, the signing officers should specify and certify in their periodic reports
whether there has been a material change and other factors that could significantly affect
the internal control system after the evaluation date. 43

ⅲ. Management Assessment of Internal Control (Section 404)
Management should evaluate the changes in the internal control system of a
company that materially impacts or is reasonably expected to impact on the financial
reporting. In other words, annual report should include internal control report under the
SOX section 404. An internal control report should prescribe ① the responsibility of
management to establish and manage an adequate internal control structure and procedures

for financial reporting, and ② an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control

structure as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the company. 44 Also, each public
accounting firm which issues the audit reporter for the company should attests to the
assessment made by the management. 45

42

Id. § 302(a)(5).

43

Id. § 302(a)(6).

44

Id. § 404(a).

45

Id. § 404(b).
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ⅳ. Code of Ethics for Senior Financial Officers (Section 406)
According to the SOX, the definition of code of ethics is standards to promote “①
honest and ethical conduct, ② full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in

periodic reports, and ③ compliance with applicable governmental regulations.” 46 The
SOX requires a public company to disclose whether the company had adopted a code of

ethics for senior financial officers and persons performing similar functions. 47 If a public
company does not disclose the adoption of the code of ethics, the company should disclose
the reason for not disclosing it. 48

3. Effects of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
ⅰ. Positive Effect
First, it is evaluated that the SOX pursues the effectiveness of accounting provisions
by a certification of signing executive officers and other officers who perform similar
functions. 49 Under the SOX, the principal executive and financial officers should certify
that “the financial statements and other financial information in the report fairly present the
financial condition and result of operation of the company for the periods presented in the

46

Id. section 406(c).

47

Id. section 406(a).

48

Id.

49

Brian Kim, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 245 (2003).
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report.” 50 If whoever willfully certifies an inadequate report, he or she “shall be fined not
more than $ 5,000,000 or imprisonment not more than 20 years, or both.” 51
It is also positive that internal control system is included in the certification to
supplement the provision. This clause not only requires the CEO to certify whether there
is a wrongdoing, but is also a guaranteed device that can make him find the wrongdoer.
Signing officers should assure the flow of financial information, and evaluate the
effectiveness of internal control system within ninety days prior to the publication of the
reports, establishing the system. 52 The Corporate law status did not enforce the internal
control system prior to the SOX, however, it evaluated that the SOX establish a standard
for its effectiveness. 53
Additionally, The SOX has enforced the quality and independence of the audit
function by assuring more autonomy of the audit committee. 54 According to the SOX, the
audit committee can hire any registered public accounting firm, oversee the work, receive
audit reports, and hold directly responsible for contents of the reports. 55 The SOX prohibits
the use of non-audit business which can affect the audit from public accounting firms to

50

Id. § 302(a)(2).

51

Id. § 906(c)(2).

52

Kim, supra note 49, at 247.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 242.

55

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 38, § 301(2).
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strengthen the independence of auditors. 56

ⅱ. Negative Effect
According to Bob Greifeld, “foreign IPO candidates are now reluctant to consider
the U.S. capital market as result of SOX compliance issues.”

57

He claims that

“approximately 90% of international small companies intending to go public are choosing
to list abroad because of SOX costs and concerns.” 58 According to the GAO report, many
public companies are going private. For example, the number of companies going private
increased drastically from 143 in 2001 to 245 in 2004 (see figure 2). 59 Even though these
numbers are a small percentage of entire public companies, the trends explain that more

56

Id. § 201(g).
Prohibited Activities (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or
financial statements of the audit client; (2) financial information systems design and
implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind
reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing services; (6) management functions
or human resources; (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services;
(8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and (9) any other service that the
Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible.

57

Peter Ferola, “Internal Controls in The Aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley: One size doesn’t fit all”, 48 S.

Tex. L. Rev. 87, 112 (2006-2007)
58

Bob Greifeld, It’s Time to pull Up Our SOX, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006 at A14; cited in Peter Ferola,

“Internal Controls in The Aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley: One size doesn’t fit all”, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 87,
112 (2006-2007).
59

U.S. Government Accountability Office, supra note 7 at 76.
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small companies are reconsidering the cost and benefits of keeping public. 60
Why did small companies go private? Many companies mentioned both the direct
and the indirect costs of maintaining their public company status. After the SOX enactment,
the companies needed more the direct cost that were the accounting and legal fees and the
indirect cost like the time to comply with SEC’s reporting requirements. 61 The Table 1
shows that the direct cost increased to 62.2% in 2005 from 12.3% in 1998, and the indirect
cost also increased to 28.9% in 2005 from 5.3% in 1998. Therefore, it can be presumed
that cost considerations like direct and indirect costs were the leading reasons for the small
companies exiting the public market.
Figure 2. TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPANIES IDENTIFIED AS GOING PRIVATE FROM 1998
TO 2005 62

60

Id.

61

Id. at 22

62

Id. at 77.
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Table 1. Primary Reasons Cited by Companies for Going Private (1998-2005) 63

E. Relevant Cases of Internal Control System

1. Caremark case
The Caremark case 64 of the Delaware court in 1996 concerns the director’s
obligation for the company’s compliance and ethics program. In this case, the court decided
that there was no fault or negligence on the supervisory obligation of the board of directors
because there was no ground that the company’s board lacked their duty of care or

63

Id. at 23.

64

Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 261-2

(1997). The facts of the case were that “Caremark entered into various agreements with health-care providers,
including consultation agreements with, and research grants to, physicians. At least some of these physicians
prescribed or recommended Caremark services or products to Medicare recipients and other patients. Based
on these agreements and grants, Caremark was indicted for violating APRL.”
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knowingly connived the violation of the company rules. 65 Instead, the supervisory duties
of the board were deemed to have met if the board of directors had worked to establish a
compliance program as a good manager. 66

2. Stone case
The Delaware Supreme Court expressly approved the so-called Caremark
doctrine, which was on the board’s responsibility with respect to the organization and
monitoring of the enterprise through the Stone case. The Stone case made it clear that the
duty of care in the Caremark was the part of the fiduciary duty of the directors, 67 and it was
needed to prove “knowing violation of statute” in order to ask for the responsibility of the
director.
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicted for
director to oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any
reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a
system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their

65

In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 956 (Del. Ch. 1996) at 972.

66

Id. at 972.

67

CHARLES R.T. O’KELLERY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS

ASSOCIATIONS CASE AND MATERIALS 374 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 7th ed. 2014). (stating “the Caremark
standard for so-called “oversight” liability draws heavily upon the concept of director failure to act in good
faith.”)
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attention. In either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligation. Directors
fail to act in the face of a known duty act, they demonstrated a conscious disregard
for their responsibilities, by breaching their duty of loyalty and by failing to
discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith. 68

Ⅲ. Current internal system and Problems in Korea
A. Status and Analysis of Legislation on Internal Control in Korea

Conglomerates in Korea have been demanded transparency and soundness of
corporate management from overseas investors since the IMF financial crisis.

69

Specifically, much interests were concentrated on securing transparency of accounting
areas as accounting fraud cases in the U.S. and fraud incidents involving Japanese financial
institutions. As a result, it became compulsory for a list of companies to be more
transparent in regards of assets and to establish an internal control system by executive
orders. The internal control system under the legislations of Korea is that ① Internal
68

Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) at 370.

69

Korean Law via the Internet, IMF Crisis,
http://www.koreanlii.or.kr/w/index.php/IMF_Crisis?ckattempt=1
(last visited on Nov. 29, 2017) (stating “IMF Crisis means the financial crisis experienced by Korean
people in the late 1990s, which was caused by the severe foreign exchange shortage on the brink of default
of South Korea in December 1997, and bailed out by the IMF Standby Credit Facility and other
international financial supports.”)
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Accounting Management System of Act on External Audit of Stock Companies (hereafter
“External Audit Act), ② Compliance Officer of Act on Corporate Governance of Financial

Companies (hereafter “Financial Company Governance Act”), and ③ Compliance
Supporter of Commercial Act. 70

Table 2. THE INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM UNDER THE KOREAN LEGISLATIONS 71
Internal Control

Purpose

Target Companies

Internal Accounting
Management

Legislations
External Audit

Accounting Control

Public companies with assets

System

Act

of more than 100 billion won
Financial

Compliance Officer

Administrative Control

Financial companies

including Compliance

including banks, insurance

Control

Compliance

companies, etc.

Compliance Control

Assistant

Company
Governance
Act

Public companies with assets

Commercial

of more than 500 billion won

Act

1. Internal Accounting Management System of External Audit Act
A compliance system, the Internal Accounting Management System, was first
enacted in the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act as a temporary statute (2001. 9. 15

70

Kwon, Jong-Ho, Gieobnaebutongjejedoui balamjighan ibbeobbanghyang [The Proper Direction of
Legislation on the Internal Control System], 25(4) BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 127, 137 (2011).
71

Chung, supra note 29, at 288. If 1 U.S. dollar can be converted to 1,115 won (Korean currency unit), 100
billion won is approximately $ 89,686,098, and 500 billion is about $ 448,430,493.
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– 2005. 12. 31) by the influence of the SOX of the U.S. in 2001. Thereafter, the compliance
system was transferred to the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies (hereafter
“External Audit Act”). 72
The External Audit Act is a law that sets out the matters necessary for the
accounting of the company under the audit of the external auditor. 73 It is stipulated that the
internal accounting management regulations and the internal accounting management
system should be established for the preparation and public notice of reliable accounting
information under the Article 8(1) of the External Auditing Act. 74 However, privately held

72

Yang, supra note 21, at 262. The Ministry of Planning and Economy submitted to the Congress a bill of
the Securities Transactions Act, the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, and the Certified Public
Accountant Act in June 2002, and they were passed in the Congress in December 2003.
73

Jusighoesa deung-ui oebugamsa-e gwanhan beoblyul [Act on External Audit of Stock Companies], Act
No. 3297, Dec. 31, 1980, amended by Act. No. 15022, Oct. 31, 2017, art. 1 (S. Kor.). “The purpose of this
Act is to protect interested persons and to contribute to the sound growth of companies by ensuring
appropriateness of accounting through obliging a stock company to be audited by an external auditor who is
independent of such company”.
74

Id. art. 8(1) (Operation, etc. of Internal Accounting Management System)
(1) Any company (excluding a company other than a stock-listed corporation, whose total amount
of assets is less than 100 billion won at the end of the immediately preceding business year;
hereafter the same shall apply in this Article) shall have internal accounting management
regulations which include the following matters and shall have the system to manage and
operate them (hereinafter referred to as "internal accounting management system") for the
preparation and public notice of reliable accounting information:
1. Matters concerning the method of identification, mensuration, classification, recording and
reporting of accounting information (including transaction related information which forms the
basis for accounting information; hereafter the same shall apply in this Article);
2. Matters concerning the method of controlling the errors of accounting information and revising
them;
3. Matters concerning the internal verification, such as a regular inspection and adjustment, etc.
of accounting information;
4. Matters concerning the method of managing books to record and keep accounting information
(including magnetic tapes, diskettes and other information storage devices) and the controlling
procedures to prevent forgery, alteration, damage, or destruction;
5. Matters concerning the segregation of duties and responsibilities of the executives and
employees related to the preparation and public notice of accounting information;
6. Other matters prescribed by Presidential Decree which are necessary for the preparation and
public notice of reliable accounting information.
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companies whose total amount of asset is less than 100 billion won at the end of the
immediately preceding business year are exempted from this application.

75

The

representative of a company shall assume the responsibility for the management and
operation of the internal accounting management system and appoints one full-time
director who is appointed as the internal accounting manager. 76 Also, the representative of
the company has an obligation to report the operating status of the internal accounting
control system to the shareholder, the board of directors, and the audit committee every
business year. 77
An external auditor who reviews a stock company’s report on the current
operational status of its internal accounting management system, shall examine whether
the internal accounting management system has been designed and operated properly,
through inquiries to relevant executives and employees verification of relevant documents,
and inspection of the current operational status of the internal control. 78 A list of stock
companies shall publish matters concerning its internal accounting management system, as
prescribed by the Financial Services Commission. 79

75

Id.

76

Id. art. 8(3)

77

Id. art. 8(4)

78

Jusighoesaui oebugamsa-e gwanhan beoblyulsihaenglyeong [Enforcement Decree of the Act on External

Audit of Stock Companies] Presidential Decree No. 10453, Sep. 3, 1981, amended by Presidential Decree
No. 28041, May 8, 2017Art. 2-3(4) (S. Kor.).
79

Id. Art. 2-3(3)
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Table 3. MATTERS

TO

BE INCLUDED

IN INTERNAL

ACCOUNTING MANAGEMENT

REGULATIONS 80
1. Matters concerning the method of identification, mensuration, classification, recording and
reporting of accounting information (including transaction related information which forms
the basis for accounting information; hereafter the same shall apply in this Article);
2. Matters concerning the method of controlling the errors of accounting information and
revising them;
3. Matters concerning the internal verification, such as a regular inspection and adjustment, etc.
of accounting information;
4. Matters concerning the method of managing books to record and keep accounting
information (including magnetic tapes, diskettes and other information storage devices) and
the controlling procedures to prevent forgery, alteration, damage, or destruction;
5. Matters concerning the segregation of duties and responsibilities of the executives and
employees related to the preparation and public notice of accounting information;
6. Other matters prescribed by Presidential Decree which are necessary for the preparation and
public notice of reliable accounting information.

2. Compliance Officer of Financial Company Governance Act
The purpose of Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies (hereafter
“Financial Company Governance Act”) which was enacted on August 1, 2016, is to protect
depositors, investors, policyholders, and other financial consumers by regulating the
qualifications of financial company executives, the composition, and operation of the board

80

Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, supra note 73, Art. 2-2(1).
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of directors. 81 Financial companies shall have establish internal control standards, and have
at least one compliance officer to report to the Audit Committee or Auditor under the
Financial Company Governance Act. 82 Also, the companies shall establish the risk
management committee as a committee within the board of directors, 83 and have at least
one risk manager to examine and manage risks incurred in business affairs and other
various transactions. 84
Specifically, the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Corporate Governance of
Financial Companies article 19 sets forth matters to be included in the internal control
standards so that internal control can be effectively implemented. Matters which should be
included in the internal control standard are as follows.

Table 4. MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE INTERNAL CONTROL STANDARD 85

81

Geum-yunghoesaui jibaegujo-e gwanhan beoblyul [Act of Corporate Governance of Financial
Companies] Act No. 13453, July 31, 2015, amended by Act. No. 14818, April 18, 2017 Art. 1 (S. Kor.).
82

Id. art. 25

83

Id. art. 16

84

Id. art. 28

85

Geum-yunghoesa jibaegujo-e gwanhan beoblyul sihaenglyeong [Enforcement Decree of the Act on
Corporate Governance of Financial Companies] Presidential Decree No. 27414, July 28, 2016, amended by
Presidential Decree No. 28391, Oct. 17, 2017 Art. 19 (S. Kor.).
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1. Job allocation and organizational structure;
2. The procedure that executive officers and employees shall observe in performing their duties;
3. The roles that the board of directors, executive officers, and compliance officers shall serve
in connection with internal control;
4. Human resources and support organizations with expertise in performance of internal
control;
5. Establishment of a system that can efficiently convey information necessary for making
decisions on business management;
6. The procedure and method for ascertaining whether executive officers and employees
observe the internal control standards and measures to be taken against executive officers
and employees who breach the internal control standards;
7. The procedure or standards for preventing violations of finance-related statutes by executive
officers and employees (including the procedure or standards for preventing unfair conduct,
including the reporting of details of transactions of financial investment products by
executive officers and employees);
8. The procedure for establishing or amending the internal control standards;
9. The procedure for appointing or dismissing compliance officers;
10. The method, procedure, etc. for managing conflicts of interest (not applicable to cases where
the relevant finance company is a financial holding company);
11. Rules on the production of advertisements of products or services and the contents of such
advertisements;
12. Evaluation and management of concurrent office of executive officers and employees under
Article 11 (1) of the Act to ascertain whether the criteria under Article 11 (4) 4 are met;
13. Other matters specified and publicly notified by the Financial Services Commission as those
that shall be prescribed in detail by the internal control standards.
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3. Compliance Assistant of Commercial Act
Public companies which have more than five billion won assets shall establish
compliance guidelines, and shall have at least one compliance assistant under the
Commercial Act in Korea. 86 Also, a compliance assistant shall check whether the
compliance guidelines is being followed and if the outcomes are being reported to the board
of directors. 87
As reviewed above, the three components of Korea’s internal control systems are
① the internal accounting control system of the External Audit Act, ② compliance officer

of Financial Company Governance Act, and ③ compliance assistant of the Commercial

Act. As a result, in the case of financial companies, the combination of ① and ②, and in
the case of public companies whose assets are more than 5 billion won, ① and ③ are
combined as internal control systems. However, public companies which are not financial

companies, could be concerned about the gap in internal control because the compliance
officer in the Commercial Act lacks the general concept of internal control and risk
management. 88

86

Sangbeob [Commercial Act], Act No. 1000, Jan. 20, 1962, amended by Act. No. 13523, Dec. 1, 2015,

art. 542-13(1) (S. Kor.).
87

Id. art. 542-13(3).

88

Kwon, supra note 70, at 142.
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B. Problems of Legislations related to Internal Control

1. Omission of general Provision for Internal Control in Commercial Act
Legal professional groups including the legislature have recognized the
importance of internal control system, and the systems have been extended from private to
public legislations in the U.S. The internal control system should have been introduced
from the perspective of Strategic Risk Management in Korea. However, it can be evaluated
that Korea has introduced internal control systems through importing individual U.S. laws,
without comprehensive review of the systems. 89
As a result, there are no a general provision for internal control system in the
Commercial Act although the act adopted the compliance officer clauses. This is different
from the legal system of Japan and the U.S. In Japan, the Corporate law (general law)
overly governs the internal control systems and the Financial Instruments and Exchange
Act 90 (special law) only regulates financial accounting controls. On the other hand, in the
U.S., the internal controls mainly focus on accounting controls, but the legislations contain
comprehensive internal control concepts of COSO reports. 91
It can be a legislative mistake that there is a no general clause for the internal control
in Commercial law as a general law, emphasizing the importance of the internal control

89

Chung, supra note 71, at 291.

90

The Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (金融商品取引法 Kin'yū shōhin torihiki-hō), promulgated

on June 14, 2006, is the main statute codifying securities law and regulating securities companies in Japan.
91

Yook, supra note 22, 167-9.
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system of public companies. 92 Also, it is desirable that directors of companies should be
liable to establish the internal control system, regardless of being public companies like the
Stone case. 93 All directors should bear the responsibility to establish internal control
systems although the content of internal control might vary depending on the size and
circumstances of the company. 94 In order to do so, it is appropriate that a general provision
for internal control system should be created in the Commercial Act through the revision
of act.

2. Problems of Cost for Establishing Internal Control System
It is substantially impossible for management to grasp every works of employees
because functions of large-scale firms are highly specialized and complicated. For these
companies, it is also impossible for executive officers to conduct surveillance tasks without
effective internal control systems. For this reason, it can be said that director’s liability for

92

Chung, supra note 29, at 288.

93

Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Da68636, Sept. 11, 2008 (S. Kor.). Korea Supreme Court benchmarked the

judgment of the Caremark case and the Stone case of the U.S. The Court decided that if the company has
established a rational internal control system, and operated it properly, the liability of the representative of
the company could be reduced.
94

The directors bear the duties of care, and loyalty by the delegation contract of the company under the

Commercial Act Article 382-3 in Korea. Directors are obliged to maintain an internal control system as a
duty of care, and have discretion to design the internal control system depending on the size of the company
and type of business.
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internal control is legislated.
The establishment of internal control related to cost. The cost problem is closely
connected to ① which company should establish internal control system under the relevant

law, ② how to concretely regulate companies for internal control implementation. 95 For

example, a public company which has more than 500 billion won shall have at least one
compliance assistant. However, many listed companies do not have compliance supporters.
82 (approximately 40%) out of 304 companies were found not to appoint a compliance
assistant according to a survey on compliance assistant retention in April 2015. 96 The
reason is that there is no incentive for companies considering cost. Also, it can be
interpreted as the companies not wanting to retain compliance assistants because there is
no sanction provision on violation of the duty in the Commercial Act.

95

Kwon, supra note 70, at 144.

96

Kang, Euntae, sangjangsa 88gae, junbeobjiwon-in seon-im-uimu wiban [88 listed companies violate the
commercial law provisions that the listed companies shall have one or more compliance assistants], NSP
NEWS AGENCY, May 6, 2015, available at http://www.nspna.com/news/?mode=view&newsid=124188 (last
visited on Nov. 8, 2017). Considering the burden of the companies, the standard of the listed of companies
was more than one trillion won in 2012, the criteria has been expanded to more than 500 billion since 2014.
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Table 5. THE RATIO

OF

COMPLIANCE ASSISTANT RETENTION

IN THE

LISTED

COMPANIES 97
(UNIT: THE NUMBER OF COMPANIES, WON- KOREAN CURRENCY UNIT)
Answer
Survey

The Number of

Compliance

Date

listed Companies

Assistant

172

69

46

57

(More than

(60%)

(40%)

(33.2%)

306

108

110

88

(More than

(49.5%)

(50.5%)

(28.8%)

304

123

82

99

(More than

(60%)

(40%)

(32.5%)

April, 2012

No Compliance

Unanswered

Assistant

1 Trillion Won)

April, 2014

500 Billion Won)

April, 2015

500 Billion Won)

The following problem is how much to regulate public companies for the internal
control implementation. In relationship to this problem, there are two different arguments.
One opinion is that only basic things are needed, and public companies should have
autonomy to decide. The other opinion is that specific standards are needed. 98 As we have

97

Id. If 1 U.S. dollar can be converted to 1,115 won (Korean currency unit), 1 trillion won is approximately

$ 896,860,986, and 500 billion is about $ 448,430,493.
98

Choi, Joon-sun & Kim, Jung-ho, Naebutongjejedo mich naebuhoegyegwanlijedoui jeongbibang-an
tolonhoe [Debate on the Improvement of Internal Control System and Internal Accounting Management
System], 16 PUBLIC COMPANY CFO FORUM NEWSLETTER, 7 (Dec. 2010).
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seen (Table 4), in the case of financial companies, the 13 matters are prescribed to be
included in internal control standard under the relevant law. It is believed that individual
companies will not be able to flexibly operate internal control systems, and it will
eventually return to the burden of the firms since it is too specific.

3. Conflict Problems of Internal Control System
ⅰ. Problems for Distinction between Compliance Officer and Compliance Assistant
It is a problem of distinction between the compliance officer who should be
appointed by financial companies and the compliance assistant in public companies under
the Commercial Act. It is distinguishable that duties of compliance assistant are limited to
the legal risks of public companies while the responsibilities of compliance officer affect
entirely the risk of financial companies. It, however, is substantially hard to distinguish
between the two agencies’ duties because a duty of compliance officer checking whether
executive officers and employees observe the internal control standards, has nature of
compliance control.
Also, the legislature should consider the burden and efficiency of the companies
in the internal control legislations. For example, if a financial company which has already
a compliance officer meets the criteria of a company with more than 5 billion won assets,
the company must retain at least one compliance assistant additionally. In this case, legal
considerations are needed. It is necessary to clarify the obligations of the compliance
officer and the compliance assistant, and reasonably explain why a separate system should
- 40 -

be established.

ⅱ. Reporting Obligation Issues
In principle, a compliance officer of the Commercial Act should check compliance
with the compliance standards of public companies, and report the results to the board of
directors. I, however, do not think that compliance officer should report to only the board
of directors. 99 In some case, it may be necessary to report to the Audit Committee first.
In comparison, although a compliance officer of financial companies should report
to the Audit Committee under the Financial Company Governance Act, 100 it is not
necessary to limit the reporting duty of the officer to the Audit Committee. It is necessary
to flexibly regulate the reporting duties of compliance officers and compliance
assistants. 101

Ⅳ. Suggestion for the legislation of internal control system in Korea
A. Need of General Provision for Internal Control in Commercial Act
A general provision for internal control system should be created in the Commercial

99

Sangbeob [Commercial Act], supra note 86, art. 542-13(3) (S. Kor.).

100

Geumyunghoesaui Jibaegujo-e Gwanhan Beobyul [Act on Corporate Governance of Financial
Companies], supra note 86, art 25 (S. Kor.).

101

Chung, supra note 71, at 291.
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Act. 102 This is because the internal control concept of public companies which is not
financial companies, is limited to compliance functions. The concept of risk management
should be introduced to public companies’ business areas by making a comprehensive
internal concept in the Commercial Act. It is necessary to apply strict internal standards to
financial companies, taking into consideration the public interest and publicity of financial
companies in the Financial Company Governance Act of public companies. The internal
control regulations of the Commercial Act (general law) and the Financial Company
Governance Act (special law) should be reasonably adjusted.
Additionally, the internal control legislations of Korea can be determined to be very
unique compared to the U.S. and Japan. First, provisions of the special law, the Financial
Company Governance Act, related to compliance officer comprehensively define internal
controls, which include compliance and business area. Next, the duty of compliance
assistant provisions of general law, the Commercial Act, are restricted to the compliance
area only.
In the U.S., although the SOX mainly focuses on accounting controls, the act adopts
a comprehensive idea of the internal concept. The SOX defines the three areas of
accounting, auditing, and corporate governance. In this sense, the SOX itself is a legislation
covering all elements of the COSO internal control concept as a general law for public
companies. Also, in Japan, the Corporate law has a provision to regulate all internal control

102

Kwon, supra note 70, at 143.
- 42 -

areas as a general law, 103 and the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act mainly
prescribes accounting control. 104

B. Minimization of Internal Control Costs
As discussed previously, the cost of establishing internal control is related to how
much regulation is burdened to companies which are applicable to the act. If the
Commercial Act has a general provision for internal control, it is reasonable that the
provision should be applied to public companies that have assets of more than 2 trillion
won, and have a board of directors based on outside directors. Companies who have more
than total assets of 2 trillion won should appoint at least three outside directors, and the
outside directors should account for more than half of the total number of directors under
the Commercial Act. 105 The companies who have outside board of directors are most likely
to be weak because outside directors are not familiar with company business. Therefore,
the companies who are have outside directors should establish internal control system to

103

Id. at 136. In the Corporate Act of Japan, the obligation of directors for internal control establishment is
to concrete the duty of care of directors. The purpose of the provision is not limited to securing the reliability
of accounting reports, but includes the effectiveness, efficiency, legal compliance, and asset protection of the
entire business.
104

Id. at 135. The purpose of the Financial Product Act of Japan is for internal controls related to corporate

accounting statements to ensure the reliability and transparency of the accounting. In other words, the listed
companies should establish internal control systems related to accounting reports, submit reports evaluating
the internal control to the prime minister, and let Certified Public Accountants certify the reports.
105

Sangbeob [The Commercial Act], supra note 86, art. 542-8(1) (S. Kor.); Sangbeobsihaenglyeong
[Enforcement Decree of The Commercial Act], Presidential Decree No. 11485, Aug. 16, 1984, amended by
Presidential Decree No. 28211, July 26, 2017 art. 34(2). "Listed companies determined by Presidential
Decree" in the provision to Article 542-8 (1) of the Act means listed companies with total assets valued at
two trillion won or more as at the end of the latest business year.
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fix this problem.106
The following is a problem of how specifically internal control provision should be
prescribed. In this regard, it is necessary to consult cases of the SOX. Particularly, there
have been claims that the internal control regulations became a burden to small-sized public
companies. It has been said that the U.S. stock market lost their competitiveness as the
companies go to foreign stock markets. The SOX is basically a system in which the
management evaluates financial statements including internal control system, and then
external auditors attest the reports.
At first, the methods of evaluating the internal control were different depending on
the management or situations of public companies, which has been a reason for causing a
cost increase. Therefore, new auditing standards of the PCAOB have been announced, and
practical procedures for the SOX have been continuously improved. 107
Considering this point, it is desirable to implement the internal control system as
legislations. However, laws should take into consideration the burden of companies, and
allow flexibility to operate the systems depending on the conditions of firms.

C. The Necessity of Indirect Enforcement of Internal Control System
There are direct and indirect enforcement methods in relation to the application of

106

Kwon, supra note 70, at 144.

107

Id. at 146.
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the internal control system. Direct enforcement is a method of establishing standards for
the listed companies, and forcing the companies to establish the internal control systems.
Indirect enforcement suggests basic standards, and let the management evaluate their
internal control activities, and have the companies disclose the results as reports. 108
In relation to internal control, there are two things to consider. First, even if the
management do not establish internal control systems, that is not a management
responsibility, internal control is not the only mean of ensuring the effectiveness and
efficiency of business. Next, internal control is not a system that can be applied to all
companies regardless of the size and type of the firm. It is necessary for companies to
operate flexibly in consideration of the size and type of companies because internal control
is also related to corporate governance. 109
Considering these points, the indirect enforcement method is more reasonable. This
is an effective way, which allows companies to consider the situation they are facing, and
they are more flexible on the contents of internal control like the SOX in the U.S. and the
Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in Japan. 110 It is necessary that the government

108

Id. at 147.

109

Yook, supra note 25, at 374. (stating that the Corporate Governance includes the Enterprise Risk

Management (ERP), and the ERP contains internal control system).; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of
Directors and Internal Control, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 237, 251 (1997). Additionally, “the board has an
important role to play in the design and administration of the internal control structure.”
110

Id. at 137. The Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in Japan does not directly impose an obligation

on management to establish internal control. It only forces the management to evaluate the validity of internal
control, disclose it, and assume accountability to the investors. This is an indirect regulatory approach, and
even if the management does not establish internal control, it does not in itself violate the Financial
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suggests general guidelines for internal control, and the companies select their models to
flexibly pursue their values depending on the situations of firms like SOX in the U.S.

D. Unification of Internal Control System

1. Unification of Compliance Assistant and Compliance Officer
Although compliance assistants for public companies and Compliance officers for
Financial Companies have different terminology, the duties of organs are overlapped, and
substantially is the same system. 111 Therefore, since compliance assistant and compliance
officer are merely a list of the same system, there is a need to unify terms and operate the
system efficiently. 112 For example, in the case of a financial company which has more than
500 billion assets, the company should have at least one compliance assistant besides a
compliance officer. In this case, it is necessary for a company to have its discretion to select
one system between a compliance assistant and a compliance officer by the legislation, in
consideration of the burden of the firm.

Instruments and Exchange Act, as long as the management submits the internal control reports.
111

Song, YangHo, Junbeobgamsiingwa junbeobjiwon-in-ui tong-ilseong pil-yo [A Study on the Necessity

of Unification between Compliance Officer under the Financial-related Laws and Compliance Officer
under the Commercial Code”, 39 CHONBUK L. REV. 153, 175 (Sep. 2013).
112

Id.
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2. Work Area Adjustment of Audit Committee and Compliance Officer
According to the general corporation law, South Korea Commercial Act Article
412 (1), auditors shall audit directors’ performance of duties and this provision shall apply
mutatis mutandis to the audit committee. 113 Also, financial company shall have at least one
compliance officer who conducts inspections on compliance with internal control standards
and who plays a role as a risk manager under the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial
Companies Article 25 and 28. 114 Accordingly, while audit committee or auditors basically

113

Sangbeob [Commercial Act], supra note 86 art. 412, 415-2 (S. Kor.).
Article 412 (Auditors' Duties and Power to Demand Reporting and to Inspect)
(1) Auditors shall audit directors' performance of duties.
(2) Auditors may, at any time, request a director to report on the relevant business and may inspect
the business affairs and financial conditions of a company.
(3) Auditors may seek assistance from professionals at the expense of the company.

114

Geumyunghoesaui Jibaegujo-e Gwanhan Beobyul [Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies],
supra note 81, art 25, 28 (S. Kor.).
Article 25 (Appointment, Dismissal, etc. of Compliance Officers) (1) Every financial company
(excluding the investment advisory business entities and discretionary investment business entities
specified by Presidential Decree, taking the size of assets, etc. into consideration) shall have at
least one person who shall conduct inspections on compliance with internal control standards,
investigate violations of internal control standards, and take charge of general affairs related to
internal control (hereafter referred to as "compliance officer“), and the compliance officer may
report results of investigation to the audit committee or auditor, if he/she finds it necessary.
(2) Every financial company shall appoint compliance officers, from among inside directors or
operating officers: Provided, that a financial company or a domestic branch of a foreign financial
company, specified by Presidential Decree in consideration of the size of assets, the financial
business in which it engages, etc., may appoint compliance officers, from among employees who
are neither inside directors nor operating officers.
(3) When a financial company (excluding domestic branches of foreign financial companies)
intends to appoint or dismiss a compliance officer, it shall obtain a resolution thereon from the
board of directors, and a resolution on dismissal shall be passed with concurrent votes of at least
two-thirds of all directors.
(4) The term of office of a compliance officer shall be at least two years.
(5) Where a financial company appoints a compliance officer, from among its employees under
the proviso to paragraph (2), it shall not appoint a fixed-term or part-time worker under the Act
on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-Term and Part-Time Workers as a compliance officer.
(6) Every financial company shall formulate and implement separate standards for remuneration
for compliance officers and evaluation of compliance officers, which shall not be linked to
financial business performance of the company.
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can be organs which keep a close watch on fraudulent acts like embezzlement and breach
of trust, compliance officers have duties to prevent violation of law in advance through
employee training and education. However, there is no substantial difference between the
two duties of them from a business perspective.
This problem can cause confusion and inefficacy while two organs are performing their
duties within the organization. To reduce business confusion and burden of cost, it is
reasonable that audit committee and internal auditors should streamline their organization’s
operation. In detail, Board of directors should establish internal control standards and
appoint compliance officer. Appointed compliance officer’s duties should be limited to
checking matters prescribed in internal control standards, and accounting inspection
authority should be given to audit committee. Audit committee, a subcommittee of board,
should hear reports about compliance matters from financial officer and ultimately have a
right to decide for only matters containing certain problems. 115 It will guarantee
compliance officer’s expertise because compliance officers can concentrate on compliance
duties. Audit committee can recognize compliance officers as assisting organs, and it can

Article 28 (Appointment, Dismissal, etc. of Risk Managers)(1) Every financial company (excluding
investment advisory business entities and discretionary investment business entities specified by
Presidential Decree, taking into consideration the size of assets, the business in which the financial
company engages, etc.) shall have at least one risk manager who shall take charge of examining
and managing risks incurred in the course of managing assets, performing business affairs, and
other various transactions.
115

Sur, Ji-min & Choi, Joon-sun, Naebutongjae-e Gwanhan Sogo – Geumyunggigwanui Naebutongjae-

reul Jungsim-euro [A Study on the Internal Control System – Focused on financial institution’s internal
control system], 22 SUNGKYUNKWAN L. REV. 865 (Dec. 2010)
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be anticipated for them to create synergy effect through cooperation. 116

E. Improvement of Incentive System
Internal control is very important system for corporate governance. There,
however, is no optimal corporate governance for all companies, regardless of type of
business or size of companies. In that sense, internal control system needs to be more
flexible with companies when choosing their system depending on the business situations,
and it is necessary to encourage more companies to establish a system. It requires an
incentive system that exempts or reduce the responsibilities of the management if the
companies faithfully abide by guidelines of internal control.
The Commercial Act also has had an incentive system provision related to the
establishment of internal control. If the public companies are punished by a fine for
transactions with interested persons including major shareholders, directors, and
auditors, 117 and the companies faithfully perform the duty related to internal control
system, the firms are exempted from penalties. 118 This incentive provision, is limited in
that it can only apply to specific companies ‘transacts with interested persons’, and is
‘punished by a fine as a joint penalty’. For the positive effect of the incentive system, it is
necessary to establish a provision to exempt the liability of the companies irrespective of

116

Id at 866.

117

Sangbeob [The Commercial Act], supra note 86, art. 542-9(1) (S. Kor.)

118

Id. at art. 634-3
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the type of the offensive behaviors, like a U.S. Sentencing guideline. 119

Ⅴ. Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to provide implication for legislation on the internal
control system in Korea, reviewing the formation and development of the concept of
internal control in the U.S. The concept of internal control began in accounting professional
groups, gradually expanded to the administrative control and the risk management from
accounting control, and became an important area that cannot be excluded from the
operation of the public companies in the U.S.
When the Enron scandal struck the credibility of the stock market in the U.S. in
2001, the authorities implemented reformative measures including the SOX enactment to
protect investors. Although there has been a controversy over this legislation since the
enactment of the SOX, it appears that the U.S. capital market has been restoring confidence
with the efforts of regulators.
Also, when the foreign exchange crisis and large-scale corporate accounting frauds
occurred in Korea, there were demands that companies should establish internal control
systems through legislations. However, the authorities in Korea tried to solve the problem
by importing internal control system mainly from the U.S. and Japan since there was no
various discussions of internal control for a long time. As a result, Korea individual
legislations separately imported the internal control provisions from the U.S. and Japan,

119

Kwon, supra note 70, at 147.
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and they have contained illogical and cost increase problems. The most fundamental
problem is that it is difficult to apply extensive concept of internal control like risk
management to public companies that are not financial companies, because there is no
general provision related the internal control in the Commercial Act, a general act for
public companies. Next, cost problem companies are neglected to establish the internal
control. Last, that is a conflict problem of internal control provisions in Korea legislations.
To solve these legislative problems, a general provision on internal control should
be created in the Commercial Act. Second, it is necessary to approach companies with
indirect regulation method like the U.S. and Japan to minimize the cost of establishment.
Finally, it is required to integrate and operate internal control agencies that possibly cause
confusion. Also, it is necessary to encourage companies to participate in establishing
internal control system by implementing proper incentive systems rather than only
imposing regulation.
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